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UNITED STATES D IST R IC T COURT
D ISTRICT O F M A IN E

Edw in D. Schindler,
Plaintiff,
v.
Angus S. King, as G overnor of the State
of M aine,
Kevin W. C oncannon, as Commissioner
of the M aine D epartm ent of H um an
Services, and
G . Steven Rowe, as A ttorney G eneral
For the State of M aine,
D efendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civ. No. 01-11-B-C

____________________________________________ )

M OTION TO DISM ISS AND
INCORPORATED M EM ORANDUM M O F LA W
Defendants hereby move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12,
Fed.R.Civ.P., and submit this Memorandum of Law in support thereof.
Plaintiff Edwin D. Schindler seeks to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes that will
allegedly harm certain pharmaceutical manufacturers. Plaintiff, however, is a natural person,
and not a pharmaceutical manufacturer. As such, he lacks standing to maintain any cause of
action for harms alleged to befall only pharmaceutical manufacturers. It is irrelevant that he
owns stock in those manufacturers. Stock ownership does not confer standing here, even if
the actions of defendants diminish the value of plaintiffs stock. The Amended Complaint
ignores this fundamental rule of law and therefore must be dismissed.

By the same token, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the Takings Clause of
the United States Constitution. The statutes at issue do not deprive him of his private
property, so he is not entitled to any compensation from the State. Moreover, the alleged
impact of the challenged statutes on pharmaceutical manufacturers falls far short of that
necessary to constitute a “regulatory taking.”
Finally, to the extent that the Amended Complaint may be construed to assert a claim
based on patent law, it fails to plead even the basic elements of patent infringement. It does
not set forth the threshold assertion that defendants have produced or marketed any product,
let alone an infringing one. Nor does it allege that the plaintiff is a patent holder or has been
assigned any patent rights. It does not even identify a patent that may be at issue. For these
additional reasons, those portions of the Amended Complaint based in patent law must be
dismissed.
STATEM ENT O F FACTS
Defendants assume the truth of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint for the
purposes of this Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff owns shares of stock in three pharmaceutical manufacturers: Pfizer, Inc.,
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., and Merck, Inc. (hereinafter “manufacturers”). Each of the
manufacturers markets prescription drugs in Maine. See Amended Complaint
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(hereafter “Amd. Comp.”).
Pharmaceutical manufacturers may be subject to various Maine statutes signed into
law on May 11, 2000, with effective dates beginning August 11, 2000. See “An Act to
Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs,” 2000 Me. Legis. Ch. 786 (S.P. 1026) (L.D.
2599) (West), to be codified at 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681, et seq. (“The Maine Rx Program”);
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22 M.R.S.A. § 2691 et seq. (“The Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act”); and 22 M.R.S.A.
§ 2691 et seq. (“Profiteering in Prescription Drugs”) (hereinafter collectively “the challenged
statutes”).
M r. Schindler also complains that the challenged statutes apply with equal force to
patented as well as non-patented prescription drugs. Amd. Comp.

9-22. The Amended

Complaint does not, however, identify - even in general terms - any patent, patent holder or
patented prescription drug.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the challenged statutes will reduce the price at
which prescription drugs are sold in Maine, which in turn will reduce the profits of the
manufacturers. It further alleges that this reduction in profits will eventually diminish the
value of the stock held by plaintiff and the price at which he will be able to sell it. Amd.
Comp. 55 25-31. None of these allegations is quantified in any way.
Plaintiff alleges that the diminution in value of his stock constitutes a “taking” of
private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, applied to Maine through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Amd.
Comp, at 12. Plaintiff also invokes the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 3.
The Amended Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and
an award of attorney fees.1

1 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, though he avers membership in the New York State Bar. See
Amd. Comp. 51.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff’s O w nership O f Stock Does Not Confer Standing To Seek Relief F or
H arm s To The Corporation T h at Issued The Stock.
Under elementary principles of law, only the corporation itself may seek judicial relief

for harms alleged to befall the corporation. Individual shareholders such as Mr. Schindler
simply have no standing to sue a third party for actions that affect the corporation, even if
those actions decrease or obliterate the value of his stock in the corporation. The Amended
Complaint overlooks this rule and therefore must be dismissed for lack o f standing.
The standing requirement is firmly rooted in the United States Constitution, which
limits the jurisdiction of-federal courts.to cases and controversies in which the parties properly
allege standing. See U.S. Const. Art IE, § 2, cl. 1; see also Risingerv. Concannon, 117
F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (D.Me. 2000) (standing is one element of the Constitution’s case or
controversy requirement). If the plaintiff lacks standing, the case must be dismissed. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Moreover, even when the plaintiff has claimed injury
sufficient to meet the “case or controversy” requirement, that claim must be based on the
plaintiffs own legal rights and may not be based on the legal rights of others. Id. at 499.
Consistent with that hornbook rule, the United States Supreme Court determined
seventy-one years ago that a stockholder does not have standing to sue a government entity
for harms to the corporation that issued the stock. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 479 (1930). That case involved a challenge to an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission affecting the rights of the Wheeling & Lake Erie Company
(“Wheeling”). The suit, however, was brought by the Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railway
(“Pittsburgh”), a minority shareholder of Wheeling. Pittsburgh contended that the ICC order
would harm Wheeling and therefore harm Pittsburgh indirectly, and brought suit to block the
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order. The Supreme Court determined that the company’s status as a shareholder of Wheeling
did not confer the necessary standing:
[T]he claim that the ICC order threatens Wheeling’s financial stability, and
consequently appellant’s financial interest as a minority stockholder, is not
sufficient to show a threat of the legal injury necessary to entitle it to bring a
suit to set aside the order. This financial interest does not differ from that of
every investor in Wheeling securities or from an investor’s interest in any
business transaction or lawsuit of his corporation . . . . The injury feared is the
indirect harm, which may result to every stockholder from harm to the
corporation. Such stockholder's interest is clearly insufficient to give
Pittsburgh standing independently to institute suit to annul this order. The bill
should have been dismissed without inquiry into the merits.
Id. at 487 (emphasis supplied).
The First Circuit has recognized the principle articulated above: “Where the direct
- injury is to the corporation . . . it is regarded as affecting only the corporation. The fact that
the injury may indirectly harm, a stockholder by diminishing the value of his corporate shares
does not bestow upon him a right to sue on his own behalf.” Pignato v. Dein Host, Inc., 835
F.2d 402, 405-06 (1st Cir. 1987) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Roeder v. Alpha
Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1987). The Pignato Court elaborated:
[I]t has been consistently held that the primary wrong is to the corporate body
and, accordingly, that the shareholder, experiencing no direct harm, possesses
no primary right to s ue. . . . Actions to enforce corporate rights or redress injuries to the corporation cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his own
name . . . even though the injury to the corporation may incidentally result in
the depreciation or destruction of the value of the stock.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). The same principle was also set forth with clarity in a
1942 decision of the Texas Supreme Court:
[Plaintiffs] injuries were suffered by the corporation, and this resulted in a
depreciation of the value of [plaintiffs] stock, and he here seeks recovery for
such depreciation. Ordinarily, the cause of action for injury to the property
of a corporation, or the impairment or destruction of its business, is vested in
the corporation, as distinguished from its stockholders, even though it may
result indirectly in loss of earnings to the stockholders. Generally, the
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individual stockholders have no separate and independent right o f action fo r
injuries suffered by the corporation which merely result in the depreciation
o f the value o f their stock. This rule is based on the principle that where such
an injury occurs each shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the
number of shares he owns, and each will be made whole if the corporation
obtains restitution or compensation from the wrongdoer. Such action must
be brought by the corporation, not alone to avoid a multiplicity of suits by the
various stockholders and to bar a subsequent suit by the corporation, but in
order that the damages so recovered may be available for the payment of the
corporation’s creditors, and for proportional distribution to the stockholders
as dividends, or for such other purposes as the directors may lawfully
determine.
Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 407, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942), cert, denied,
320 U.S. 210 (1943) (emphasis supplied). This rule against shareholder standing is applied
nearly everywhere. See, e.g., Sparling v. Hoffman Construction Company, Inc., 864 F.2d 635
(9th Cir. 1988); Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1928); Strough v.
Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964F.Supp. 783, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); W. Clay Jackson
Enterprises, Inc. v. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 463 F.Supp. 666 (D.P.R. 1979);
Henry v. General Motors Corp., 236 F.Supp. 854 (N.D.N.Y 1964); Ribicoffv. Division o f
Public Utility Control, 38 Conn.Supp. 24, 29, 445 A.2d 325, 330 (1980); Funkv. Spalding, 74
Ariz. 219, 246 P.2d 184 (1952).
There can be no doubt that the Amended Complaint alleges that the manufacturers,
and only the manufacturers, suffer direct harm from the challenged statutes.2 See Amd.
Comp, i f 25-30 (alleging that the challenged statutes will depress corporate revenues,
diminish profits, and reduce stock price and market capitalization of the manufacturers).
Although we deny that the challenged statutes will cause any cognizable harm to the
manufacturers, we acknowledge that each of the challenged statutes applies to entities that sell
2

Defendants do not concede that the manufacturers themselves have standing to challenge the
statutes at issue.
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prescription drugs. Specifically, the Maine Rx Program establishes a system by which
manufacturers of prescription drugs may negotiate rebate payments to the State, see
22 M.R.S.A. § 2681, et seq.; the Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act establishes a
procedure for setting the maximum retail prices for prescription drugs sold in the State, see
22 M.R.S.A. § 2691 et seq.; and the Profiteering in Prescription Drugs provision prohibits
“manufacturer[s], distributor[s] or labeler[s]” from, inter alia, “exacti[ing] or dem anding] an
unconscionable price,” see 22 M.R.S.A. § 2691 et seq. Each of these statutory provisions
plainly applies only to entities engaged in the sale of prescription drugs, and not to individuals
such as Mr. Schindler.
Mr. Schindler does not allege that the statutes apply to him directly. The only harm
Mr. Schindler himself allegedly will experience is indirect - that defendants’ actions would
reduce the manufacturers’ profitability, which in turn would reduce the value of Mr.
Schindler’s stock. See Amd. Comp. I f 30-31 (reduced market price resulting from the
application of the challenged statutes to the manufacturers will reduce the value of Mr.
Schindler’s property interest in the stock owned by him). These allegations of indirect harm
are entirely dependent on - and derivative of - allegations of harm to the corporations.
Under the legal principles set forth above and consistently applied in every jurisdiction of
which we are aware, such allegations of indirect harm are “clearly insufficient” to confer
standing. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co., 281 U.S. at 487.
Put differently, stock ownership gives the shareholder rights against the corporation
itself (e.g. voting rights in corporate matters), as opposed to rights against those with whom
the corporation has dealings. The corporation is a distinct, intermediary legal entity, and just
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as Mr. Schindler has no obligation for the debts of the corporation, he has no claim on
liabilities that may be owed to it. As Justice Holmes put it:
The corporation is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that makes it
impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its m em bers.. .. The
stockholders in some circumstances can call on the corporation to account, but
that is a very different thing from having an interest in the property by means
of which the corporation is enabled to settle the account.
Klein v. Board o f Tax Sup’rs o f Jefferson County, Kentucky, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930).
The rule against individual shareholder suits serves several salutary purposes. It
enables directors and management to speak in court on behalf of the corporation with one
voice. If each shareholder had standing to sue for injuries to the corporation, the resulting
multiplicity of suits would ultimately harm shareholders by wrecking havoc with the
corporation’s ability to prosecute its own legal claims. It would also threaten to overwhelm
the judicial system and needlessly burden defendants. See Note, Distinguishing Between
Direct and Derivative Shareholders’Suits, 110 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1147, 1148 (1962); see also
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d § 1821 et seq.
There are two exceptions to the general rule against shareholder standing, but neither
applies here. First, both state law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow an
individual shareholder to bring a “derivative proceeding” on behalf of the corporation,
provided that the shareholder follows certain well-defined procedures. For example, under
Maine law3 the shareholder must establish that the corporation has declined to take suitable

Generally, the applicable substantive law in derivative proceedings is that of the state in
which the manufacturer is incorporated. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523,
533 (1984); see also In re General Instrument Corp. Securities Litigation, 23 F.Supp.2d 867,
871 (N.D.I11. 1998). The Amended Complaint does not specify the state or states that supply
the applicable law, or the states of incorporation of the manufacturers. It would make little
difference, however, because the controlling legal principles have nearly universal
application.
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action, specifically, by making a formal “demand” and then waiting 90 days before
commencing the derivative proceeding. 13-A M.R.S.A. § 628 et seq.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P.
23.1 (“complaint shall. . . allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort”).
In any event, the manufacturers have already taken suitable action on behalf of
shareholders such as Mr. Schindler. In particular, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), a trade association of the pharmaceutical industry,
brought suit in this court on August 11,2000 seeking much the same relief as that sought by
Mr. Schindler. Chief Judge D. Brock Hornby has entered a preliminary injunction against
certain provisions of the statute. See Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Civ. No.
00-157-B-H (D.Me. Oct. 26, 2000) (Hornby, C.J.).4 Each of the manufacturers in which Mr.
Schindler owns stock - Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Merck, Inc. and Pfizer, Inc. - is represented
by PhRMA. See PhRMA Web Page, http://www.phrma.org/who/memlist.phtml. Thus, even
if Mr. Schindler were to attempt to follow the necessary procedures for bringing derivative
suits, he plainly could not show that the companies are not already vigorously pursuing their
rights and remedies on behalf of their shareholders, including Mr. Schindler himself.
The second exception to the rule against shareholder standing applies when a
shareholder suffers harm that is distinct from that suffered by the other shareholders. See

4 Mr. Schindler filed a brief amicus curiae in that litigation, which is now pending before the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (1st Cir. Docket 00-2446).
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Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10,13 (1st Cir. 1988) (shareholder may recover as an
individual only if the injury to his or her stock were peculiar to him or her alone, and did not
fall alike upon other stockholders); see also Roeder, supra, 814 F.2d at 30 (courts are
unanimous in not allowing shareholders to bring actions in their own right for injuries to the
corporation absent some specific direct harm to the shareholders). Mr. Schindler, however,
does not allege any harm unique to him. He complains of only one harm - the alleged
diminution in the value of the stock of the three manufacturers. If proven, that harm would be
shared proportionately by every person who owns stock in these companies. He plainly does
not allege any harm to him distinct from the harm to other shareholders. Therefore this is
precisely the situation in which the general mle against shareholder standing must be
followed, and no exception applies.
Mr. Schindler lacks standing to bring this action, and the Amended Complaint
therefore must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Court need not reach the
Takings Clause and patent law issues. Nonetheless, the following sections explain why those
arguments are also fatally flawed.
II.

T he Challenged Statutes Do Not Am ount To A C onstitutional T aking F ro m
M r. Schindler.
Mr. Schindler asserts that the challenged statutes constitute a taking of private

property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. That argument fails for two reasons. First, Mr. Schindler simply has no
“private property” interest in the undistributed revenues of the manufacturers. Second, to the
extent that the challenged statutes have an economic impact on the manufacturers, it does not
rise to the level of a constitutional taking. Each of these points is independently sufficient to
mandate dismissal of the Amended Complaint.

to

A. The Manufacturers’ Revenues Are Not Mr. Schindler’s Private Property.
Plaintiffs Takings Clause claim fails because the manufacturers’ revenues that
allegedly will be diminished by the challenged statutes simply are not the private property of
Mr. Schindler. See Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422,430 (9th Cir. 1996), cert, denied,
117 S.Ct. 768 (1997) (corporate profits belong to the corporation, not the shareholders, and
plaintiff shareholders therefore have no proprietary interest that could have been “taken”
within the meaning of the Takings Clause). Unless and until a corporation is dissolved, a
shareholder such as Mr. Schindler simply is not the legal owner of undistributed revenues or
other corporate assets. See, e.g., Coala, Inc. v. Aureus International, Inc., 182 B.R. 887, 893
n.3 (N.D.Ala. 1995) (under Alabama law shareholders are entitled to aliquot portion of the
assets of the corporation but only when a dividend is declared or the corporation is
liquidated); see also 13-A M.R.S.A. § 1106 (upon dissolution, corporation may distribute its
assets to shareholders, after discharging all corporate debts and obligations). Nor does Mr.
Schindler claim a personal property right in any patent. His only property right is his
equitable ownership interest in the manufacturers themselves, which does not make him an
owner of the assets of those corporations. He therefore cannot claim that any action of
defendants deprives him of his private property.5

5 For the same reason, Mr. Schindler’s interest as a stockholder does not constitute a “right”
or “privilege” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is impaired by harm to the corporation.
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B. The Challenged Statutes Do Not Constitute A Regulatory Taking.
As set forth below, the manufacturers themselves could not successfully claim that any
reduction in their profits resulting from the challenged statutes constitutes an unconstitutional
taking. Mr. Schindler, whose interests as a shareholder surely are no greater than those o f the
manufacturers, therefore cannot claim that he has been subjected to a “regulatory taking.”
There are several reasons why the challenged statutes do not amount to a regulatory
taking. First, future profits generally are not the kind of “property” interest protected by the
Takings Clause. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,66 (1979) ("loss of future profits —
unaccompanied by any physical property restriction - provides a slender reed upon which to
rest a takings claim"); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503,517-18 (1944) (upholding rent
control regulation even though effect of regulation was to reduce rent that landlords could
collect); Maine Beer & Wine Wholesalers Association v. State o f Maine, 619 A.2d 94, 97
(1993) (“Although both tangible and intangible property may be the subject of an '
impermissible taking, there is no property right to potential or future profits”).
Second, a law or regulation does not result in a constitutional taking merely because it
causes a property interest to be less valuable. A taking ordinarily requires a very substantial
(if not total) diminution in the economic value of the property in question, amounting to a de
facto confiscation. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)
(the Supreme Court has “uniformly rejected] the proposition that diminution in property
value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’”)- Here, Mr. Schindler only alleges that his
stock will decrease in value by some unquantified amount, and does not claim that it has been
rendered worthless.
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Third, a new law or regulation that allegedly interferes with an economic interest
rarely rises to the level of a “regulatory taking” where the industiy historically has been
subject to government regulation. See Concrete Pipe and Products o f California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust fo r Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (new
laws or regulations in an industiy long subject to regulation could have been foreseen by
reasonable investors and therefore do not amount to a regulatory taking); see also Golden
Pacific Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066,1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (investor who chooses
to invest in highly regulated industry has no reasonably expectation of compensation in
connection with new restriction). Any reasonable investor in prescription drug manufacturers
does so with the knowledge that health care services and products such as prescription drugs
have long been subject to a plethora of state and federal laws.
In short, under well-established and controlling principles of law, the manufacturers
would have no claim under the Takings Clause. Mr. Schindler - whose interests are certainly
no greater than those of the manufacturers - therefore could not possibly have such a claim
himself. The Amended Complaint therefore must be dismissed pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
III.

Plaintiff Has Failed To Plead A Cause Of Action Under Federal Patent Law.
The Amended Complaint contains several statements referencing patented prescription

drugs.6 See Amd. Comp,

9-22. But Mr. Schindler does not allege that he owns any patent

or has been assigned any patent interests himself. In fact, he does not identify a patent or a
patent owner that might be at issue here. Plaintiff therefore makes his references to federal

6 The Amended Complaint does not invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which gives the federal
district courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal patent laws. Amd. Comp. 1 7.

patent law in a factual void, and even the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is not satisfied. The Amended Complaint also fails to make any
connection between the references to patents and any specific cause of action. Nonetheless,
we address the Amended Complaint as though it does attempt to set forth a cause of action
under patent law.
Federal patent law endows patent holders with the right to a limited monopoly,
meaning the judicially enforceable right to exclude others from making or marketing the
patented product for a limited period of time. See Robert L. Harmon, Patents and the
Federal Circuit, BNA 1998 (4th Ed.), at 3-4. Accordingly, the causes of action created by
federal patent law - chiefly, patent infringement - are intended to remedy violations of the
right to exclude. See 28 U.S.C. § 271 (“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention” commits patent infringement). Thus, plaintiff correctly cites
federal patent law for the proposition that a patent owner may “exclude others from making,
using or selling the patented invention” (Amd. Comp. 120), but nowhere does he allege that
any defendant actually “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.” In fact,
the State of Maine is a consumer of patented prescription drugs through various state
programs such as Medicaid. It is not a producer, and therefore the actions of defendants
could not conceivably threaten any patent holder’s “right to exclude.”
The Amended Complaint is utterly devoid of specifics to support the patent
allegations. Even assuming that the Amended Complaint were amended again to allege that
one or more of the manufacturers owns patent rights, any claim by Mr. Schindler on the basis
of the diminution of the value of such a patent would be derivative of the manufacturers’
rights and therefore subject to the same standing defect that dooms the remainder of his case.
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See Textile Productions, Inc. v. M ead Corp, 134 F.3d 1481, 1483-84 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (only a
patentee may bring an action for patent infringement, and even a licensee lacks standing); see
also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 917 F.Supp. 305 (D.Del. 1995)
(same).
Finally, although Mr. Schindler correctly points out that the Constitution and federal
patent law create a property right, it is a narrowly circumscribed right that is only offended
when the right to exclude is actually transgressed.7 It only guarantees that patent holders will
enjoy a temporary monopoly on their patented invention, free from competitors seeking to
produce identical products. Mr. Schindler, however, appears to claim much more - that a
patent also provides legal protection against any act of government that would tend to
diminish the profits that otherwise might flow from the patent.
That simply is not the law. Patented drugs are routinely subjected to numerous state
and federal restrictions that unquestionably reduce their profitability. For an obvious
example, federal law prohibits the sale or distribution of patented prescription drugs until the
manufacturer completes the lengthy and expensive process of earning FDA approval. See
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) ("[n]o person shall introduce or deliver
for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug" without first obtaining FDA
approval). Likewise, under federal law patented prescription drugs may not be sold without a
doctor’s written or oral order. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(a)(B). Yet no patent holder would contend
that these federal requirements infringe any patent, and no court has so held. Mr. Schindler’s

7 For example, even “starting to infringe or an attempt to infringe a patent invention does not
. . . . give the patent owner a claim t h a t . . . any . . . court has ever considered to be a valid
basis for relief.” Kersavage v. United States, 36 Fed.Cl. 441 (1996).
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argument fails because patent law simply does not prohibit government bodies from enacting
laws that apply to the market in prescription drugs - patented or otherwise.
We have not found a single case in which a state statute has been enjoined because it
applied to an industry in which patented goods are produced and sold, or otherwise
diminished the value of a patent. Courts properly have considered the application of patent
liability against the states only when the governmental entity is competing with the patent
holder. See, e.g., Watts v. University o f Delaware, 622 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1980) (addressing
allegation that state university produced a chair based on a design patented by the plaintiff).8
To the extent that plaintiff invokes the federal patent statute, he appears to advance an
expansion of rights unlike anything previously recognized in patent law. Federal patent law
simply does not prohibit state and federal governments from enacting statutes applicable to
industries that deal in patented goods. Any claims relating to patents therefore have no merit
and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.CivJP. 12(b)(6).

8

In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, et a l,
527 U.S. 627 (1999), the Supreme Court held that states have sovereign immunity in patent
cases despite Congress’ attempt to waive it. The Supreme Court pointed out the rarity of
patent infringement suits against States, noting that the lower court had only identified eight
patent infringement suits prosecuted against States in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990.
See 527 U.S. at 640.
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CONCLUSION
Only the manufacturers themselves, and not Mr. Schindler, could possibly have
standing to challenge the statues at issue. Moreover, the Amended Complaint fails to plead a
cause o f action under the Takings Clause or federal patent law. Accordingly, Mr. Schindler
presents no justiciable case or controversy, and the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

Dated: March
G. Steven R o w e
Attorney General o f Maine

Assistant Attorney General
^TTState House Station
Augusta, M E 04333
(207) 626-8800
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C ER TIFIC A TE O F SERV ICE
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served on this day a true copy of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated Memorandum of Law by First Class
Mail, postage prepaid, on:

Edwin D. Schindler '
Plaintiff, pro se
Five Hirsch Avenue
P.O. Box 966
Coram, NY 11727-0966

D ated March l(> . 2001

L b id :
JOHN R. BRAI
Assistant Attom&y_0'eneral
Department o f the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, M aine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800

U S. DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
BANGOR
RECEIVED AND FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

BY:

WILLIAM S. BROWNELL, CLERK
DEPUTY CLERK

)

EDWIN D.

SCHINDLER,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
) Civil Action No.
)

-v.-

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)

Defendant.

O/

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

)

______________________________________)

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, Edwin D. Schindler, for his Complaint against
Defendant, the State of Maine, alleges that:
THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff, Edwin D. Schindler, is a natural person

and citizen of the State of New York, having his principal
place of business at Five Hirsch Avenue, Coram, New York
11727-1449.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been, and

remains, a registered shareholder, having both legal and
beneficial ownership of, and full title to:
(a) 12,927 shares of Pfizer Inc. ("Pfizer") having an
approximate market value of $538,894;
(b) 3,774 shares of Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") having
an approximate market value of $314,421; and,
(c) 1,864 shares of Johnson & Johnson, Inc. ("J&J")
having an approximate market value of $175,566.
-1-

Plaintiff is also a member of the Bar of the State of New
York and is admitted to practice before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and is registered to practice as a patent attorney
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
2.

Upon information and belief, Defendant, the State of

Maine, has enacted, and has established under "color of law"
by the statutory laws of the State of Maine, the "Prescrip
tion Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681, establishing "The
Maine Rx Program"; the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696; and the "Profiteering in
Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698.
COUNT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ARISING FROM
DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL STATUTORY LAV
3.

This is a civil rights action for a declaratory

judgment and a permanent injunction arising from Defendant’s
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights
under the "Takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which has been held to be
incorporated by reference in, and therefore applicable to
Defendant by, the "Due Process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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Plaintiff

brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
4.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter

of this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, in
combination with 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
5.

Venue is proper in this judicial district, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
6.

Plaintiff is a person within the class of persons,

defined by 42 U.S.C. §1983 as "any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof" who
may seek relief for any "deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws. . . . "
7.

Plaintiff has a property interest in each of Pfizer,

Merck and J&J, as represented by the ownership of equity.
8.

Pfizer, Merck and J&J each market prescription drugs

in the State of Maine, which would be subject to the
provisions of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.
§2681; the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696; and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698.
9.

None of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22

M.R.S. §2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22
M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, nor the "Profiteering in Prescription
-3-

Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. .§§2697 - 2698, makes any distinction
between prescription drugs, which are covered by the claims
of one or more unexpired United States patents ("patented
prescription drugs") and those prescription drugs that are
not covered by the claims of any unexpired United States
patent ("unpatented prescription drugs.")
10.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, establishing "The Maine Rx Program," is intended to
apply to patented prescription drugs marketed in the State of
Maine.
11.

The "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22

M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, is intended to apply to patented
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine.
12.

The "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22

M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, is intended to apply to patented
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine.
13.

The Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, are all intended to reduce,
depress, erode, discount or otherwise lower the prices of
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine, including
the prices of patented prescription drugs.
14.

Section 261 of the United States Patent Law, 35
-4-

U.S.C. §261, provides that "patents shall have the attributes
of personal property."
15.

Section 271 of the United States Patent Law, 35

U.S.C. §271, gives a patent owner the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the patented invention within
the United States for the term of the patent.
16.

A "patented invention" is the private property of

the patent owner and not within the public domain prior to
expiration of the relevant patent(s).
17.

A patent owner "is entitled to exact the full value

of his invention" during the unexpired term of his patent.
See, e.g., United States v. Studieneese11schaft Kohle .
m. b.H. . 670 F.2d 1122, 1128, 212 USPQ 889, 895 (D.C. Cir.
1981 ) .
18.

"Price erosion" is one method for measuring damages

sustained by a patent owner resulting from the infringement
of the patent owner’s patent.
19.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine which would be subject
to the pricing guidelines and restrictions of the "Prescrip
tion Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681, the "Prescription
Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698 .
-5-

20.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine and the prices which
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J could seek to charge for their
patented prescription drugs within the jurisdiction of the
State of Maine would be subject to any applicable limits
enforceable by 22 M.R.S. §2697, entitled "Profiteering in
prescription drugs."
21.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine and the prices which
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J could seek to charge for their
patented prescription drugs within the jurisdiction of the
State of Maine could subject each or all of them to damages,
penalties and/or injunctive relief under 22 M.R.S. §2697,
entitled "Profiteering in prescription drugs" and/or under
Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.
22.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, seek to reduce, erode,
depress, discount or otherwise lower the prices that Pfizer,
Merck and/or J&J may charge for their patented prescription
drugs within the jurisdiction of the State of Maine and, as a
result, the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,
the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691
- 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act,"
-6-

22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, conflict with the property .rights
attendant the ownership of a United States patent, which
allow a patent owner to exact the full value of the invention
so patented.
23.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, seek to reduce, erode,
depress, discount or otherwise lower the prices that Pfizer,
Merck and/or J&J may charge for their patented prescription
drugs within the jurisdiction of the State of Maine and would
therefore tend to reduce or depress sales revenues for
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J.
24.

A reduction in sales revenues for Pfizer, Merck

and/or J&J would tend to reduce or depress the profits of
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J from what profits would otherwise be
earned had the State of Maine not enacted the "Prescription
Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681, the "Prescription Drug
Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, and/or the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698 .
25.

A reduction in the profits, or earnings, of Pfizer,

Merck and/or J&J would tend to reduce or depress the
respective market capitalizations of Pfizer, Merck and/or
J&J, which would be reflected in the respective market prices
-7-

accorded to one share of stock of Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J.
26.

A reduction in the market capitalizations of

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, resulting from a reduction in
earnings, or profits, of Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, as a
direct consequence of the State of Maine’s enactment and
execution of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.
§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, would reduce or depress the
value of Plaintiff’s property interest, or equity ownership
interest, in Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, and would thereby
amount to a "taking" from Plaintiff of private property for
public use, without just compensation, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and made
applicable to the State of Maine, via incorporation, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, thereby violating Plaintiff’s
civil rights, such violation of civil rights continuing
unabated.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment as
fo1lows:
I.

The entry of a declaratory judgment holding that

Defendant, the State of Maine, by enacting and establishing,
-8-

under "color of law.," by the statutory laws of the State of
Maine, the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,
establishing "The Maine Rx Program"; the "Prescription Drug
Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696; and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698, constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" of Plaintiff’s
private property, for public use, without just compensation,
by eroding the value of Plaintiff’s property interest, or
equity ownership interest, in Pfizer Inc., Merck & Co., Inc.
and/or Johnson & Johnson, Inc., in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable
to the Defendant, the State of Maine, via incorporation,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, thereby violating Plaintiff’s
civil rights, such violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights
continuing unabated.
II.

The entry of orders granting Plaintiff preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendant, the
State of Maine, from implementing, applying, enforcing or
otherwise executing any and all provisions of the "Prescrip
tion Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681; the "Prescription
Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696; and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698, to the full extent that all such statutory laws of the
state of Maine, in any manner whatsoever, are implemented,
applied, enforced or otherwise executed for the purposes of
-9-

controlling, regulating, eroding, depressing, discounting ox.,
in any manner, whatsoever capping or limiting the prices
charged by Pfizer Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. and/or Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. for any and all patented prescription drugs
which may be marketed by Pfizer Inc., Merck & Co., Inc.
and/or Johnson & Johnson, Inc., within the jurisdiction of
the Defendant, State of Maine.
III.
IV.

All damages as may be proved.
That Plaintiff be awarded his reasonable attorney’s

fees under the Section 2 of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Award Act of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1988.
V.

That the Court grant Plaintiff such other and

further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the
circumstances.
Respectfully submitted

Dated: January 17, 2001
Coram, New York
Plaintiff, pro se
Five Hirsch Avenue
P. 0. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Telephone: (631)474-5373
Telefax:
(631)474-5374

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
)

EDWIN D. SCHINDLER,
Plaint iff,
- v

)
)

) Civil Action No. 01-11-B-C

. -

[STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)

)

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

Def endant.]
Gene Carter, J.

ANGUS S. KING, as Governor
of the State of Maine,
KEVIN W. CONCANNON, as
)
Commissioner of the Maine
)
Department of Human Services,)
G. STEVEN ROWE, as Attorney
General for the State of
Maine,

)
)

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF FILING OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
UNDER RULE 15(a) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Plaintiff, Edwin D. Schindler, hereby gives notice to
the Court and Defendants of the filing and service of his
Amended Complaint, as a matter of course, pursuant to Rule
15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concurrently
with the filing and service of this pleading.
The Amended Complaint is substantively identical to the
original Complaint, which is being served upon Defendants
concurrently with service of the Amended Complaint and a copy
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of the Summons, except that the Amended Complaint names as
Defendants, Angus S. King, Jr., in solely his official
capacity as the Governor of the State of Maine; Kevin W.
Concannon, in solely his official capacity as the Commis
sioner of the Department of Human Services of the State of
Maine; and, G. Steven Rowe, in solely his official capacity
as the Attorney General for the State of Maine.
The Amended Complaint deletes the "State of Maine" as a
formal Defendant in this federal action.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the addition and
deletion of parties in an Amended Complaint, filed as a
matter of course pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), does not
require the filing of a separate motion under Fed.R.Civ.P.
21.

See, De Malherbe v. Int’l Union of Elevator Construc

tors , 438 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (allowing plaintiff
the right to add parties prior to a responsive pleading by
defendant without leave of court being granted); C it ibank v .
GlenConstr. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 511 (D. Hawaii 1975) (plaintiff
needed only to file its amended complaint pursuant to Rule
15(a) and that a separate motion under Rule 21 is not
required); see, also, Adams v. Lederle Labs., 569 F.Supp.
234 (E.D. Mo. 1983); United States v. Sinclair, 347 F.Supp.
1129 (D. Del. 1972).
Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully contends that the
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present civil rights action now proceed forward on the basis
of the Amended Complaint now being filed and served.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 29, 2001
Coram, New York
Plaintiff, pro se
Five Hirsch Avenue
P. O. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Telephone: (631)474-5373
Telefax:
(631)474-5374

1
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CERTIFICATE

OF

SERVICE

I, EDWIN D. SCHINDLER, hereby certify that a true and
accurate copy of Plaintiff Edwin D. Schindler’s, "NOTICE OF
FILING OF AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 15(a) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE" was sent, via the United States
Postal Service -Express Mail - Post Office to Addressee postage-prepaid - to:
Angus S. King, Jr.
Governor of the State of Maine
Office of the Governor
1 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0001
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480565 US)
Kevin W. Concannon
Commissioner of the Department of
Human Service of the State of Maine
221 State Street
Augusta, Maine 04333
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480485 US)
G. Steven Rowe
Attorney General for the State of Maine
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480525 US)
on January 29, 2001.

Five Hirsch Avenue
P. O. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Tel:
(631)474-5373
Fax:
(631)474-5374

UNITED STATES D IS T R IC T COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE
)
)
)
)
)

EDWIN D. SCHINDLER,
Plaintiff,
-v. -

) Civil Action No. 01-11-B-C
)

ANGUS S. KING, as Governor
of the State of Maine,

)
)

Gene Carter, J.

)

KEVIN W. CONCANNON, as
)
Commissioner of the Maine
)
Department of Human Services , )
G. STEVEN ROWE, as Attorney
General for the State of
Maine,
Defendants.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, Edwin D. Schindler, for his Amended Complaint
as a matter of course, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, alleges that:
THE PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff, Edwin D. Schindler, is a natural person

and citizen of the State of New York, having his principal
place of business at Five Hirsch Avenue, Coram, New York
11727-1449.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been, and

remains, a registered shareholder, having both legal and
beneficial ownership of, and full title to:

(a) 12,944 shares of Pfizer Inc. ("Pfizer") having an
approximate market value of $573,581;
(b) 3,774 shares of Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") having
an approximate market value of $310,412; and,
(c) 1,864 shares of Johnson & Johnson, Inc. ("J&J")
having an approximate market value of $171,372.
Plaintiff is also a member of the Bar of the State of New
York and is admitted to practice before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the'United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and is registered to practice as a patent attorneybefore the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
2.

Defendant, Angus S. King, Jr., is the Governor of

the State of Maine and is being sued solely in his official
capacity as such.
3.

Defendant, Kevin W. Concannon, is Commissioner of

the Department of Human Services of the State of Maine and is
being sued solely in his official capacity as such.
4.

Defendant, G. Steven Rowe, is the Attorney General

for the State of Maine and is being sued solely in his
official capacity as such.

-2-

COUNT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ARISING FROM
DEFENDANTS'5 VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
6.

This is a civil rights action for a declaratory

judgment and a permanent injunction arising from Defendants’
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights
under the "Takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which has been held to be
incorporated by reference in, and therefore applicable to
Defendants by, the "Due Process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff

brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
7.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter

of this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, in
combination with 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202.
8.

Venue is proper in this judicial district, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1391 (b).
9.

Plaintiff is a person within the class of persons,

defined by 42 U.S.C. §1983 as "any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof" who
may seek relief for any "deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
1a w s .

.

10.

.

."

Plaintiff has a property interest in each of
-3 -

Pfizer, Merck and J&J, as represented by the ownership of
equi ty.
11.

The State of Maine has enacted, and has established

under "color of law" by the statutory laws of the State of
Maine, the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,
establishing "The Maine Rx Program"; the "Prescription Drug
Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696; and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698.
12.

Defendants, in their respective capacities as

public officials of the State of Maine, and otherwise
obligated to execute and enforce the laws of the State of
Maine, are executing and enforcing, or would be obligated to
execute and enforce, Maine’s "Prescription Drug Access Act,"
22 M.R.S. §2681, establishing "The Maine Rx Program"; the
"Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 2696; and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22
M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698.
13.

Pfizer, Merck and J&J each market prescription

drugs in the State of Maine, which would be subject to the
provisions of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.
§2681; the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696; and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698.
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14.

None of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22

M.R.S. §2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22
M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, nor the "Profiteering in Prescription
Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, makes any distinction
between prescription drugs, which are covered by the claims
of one or more unexpired United States patents ("patented
prescription drugs") and those prescription drugs that are
not covered by the claims of any unexpired United States
patent ("unpatented prescription drugs.")
15.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, establishing "The Maine Rx Program," is intended to
apply to patented prescription drugs marketed in the State of
Maine, and Defendants are enforcing, or would be expected to
enforce, this provision of the laws of the State of Maine in
a manner which would apply to patented prescription drugs
marketed in the State of Maine.
16.

The "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22

M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, is intended to apply to patented
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine, and
Defendants are enforcing, or would be expected to enforce,
this provision of the laws of the State of Maine in a manner
which would apply to patented prescription drugs marketed in
the State of Maine.
17.

The "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22

M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, is intended to apply to patented
-5-

prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine, and
Defendants generally, and in particular G. Steven Rowe, the
Attorney General of the State of Maine, are enforcing, or
would be expected to enforce, this provision of the laws of
the State of Maine in a manner which would apply to patented
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine.
18.

The Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, are all intended to reduce,
depress, erode, discount or otherwise lower the prices of
prescription drugs marketed in the State of Maine, including
the prices of patented prescription drugs, and Defendants are
enforcing, or would be expected to enforce, this provision of
the laws of the State of Maine in a manner which would apply
to patented prescription drugs marketed in the State of
Maine.
19.

Section 261 of the United States Patent Law, 35

U.S.C. §261, provides that "patents shall have the attributes
of personal property."
20.

Section 271 of the United States Patent Law, 35

U.S.C. §271, gives a patent owner the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the patented invention within
the United States for the term of the patent.

-6-
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21.

A "patented invention" is the private property of

the patent owner and not within the public domain prior to
expiration of the relevant patent(s).
22.

A patent owner "is entitled to exact the full value

of his invention" during the unexpired term of his patent.
See, e.g., United States v. StudienzeseJ1schaft Kohle,
m.b.H. . 670 F.2d 1122, 1128, 212 USPQ 889, 895 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
23.

"Price erosion" is one method for measuring damages

sustained by a patent owner resulting from the infringement
of the patent owner’s patent.
24.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine which would be subject
to the pricing guidelines and restrictions of the "Prescrip
tion Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681, the "Prescription
Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696, and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698, and Defendants are enforcing, or would be expected to
enforce, these provision of the laws of the State of Maine in
a manner which would apply to patented prescription drugs
marketed in the State of Maine.
25.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine and the prices which
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J could seek to charge for their
-7-

patented prescription drugs within the jurisdiction of the
State of Maine would be subject to any applicable limits,
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §2697, entitled "Profiteering in
prescription drugs," which would be enforceable by Defendants
generally and, in particular, by Defendant, G. Steven Rowe,
as the Attorney General for the State of Maine.
26.

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J market patented prescrip

tion drugs within the State of Maine and the prices which
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J could seek to charge for their
patented prescription drugs within the jurisdiction of the
State of Maine could subject each or all of them to damages,
penalties and/or injunctive relief under 22 M.R.S. §2697,
entitled "Profiteering in prescription drugs" and/or under
Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, which would be
enforceable by Defendants generally and, in particular, by
Defendant, G. Steven Rowe, as the Attorney General for the
State of Maine.
27.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, seek to reduce, erode,
depress, discount or otherwise lower the prices that Pfizer,
Merck and/or J&J may charge for their patented prescription
drugs within the jurisdiction of the State of Maine and, as a
result, the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,

-
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the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691
- 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act,"
22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, conflict with the property rights
attendant the ownership of a United States patent, which
allow a patent owner to exact the full value of the invention
so patented, and would be preempted by the Patent Laws of the
United States.
28.

The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, seek to reduce, erode,
depress, discount or otherwise lower the prices that Pfizer,
Merck and/or J&J may charge for their patented prescription
drugs within the jurisdiction of the State of Maine and would
therefore tend to reduce or depress sales revenues for
Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J.
29.

A reduction in sales revenues for Pfizer, Merck

and/or J&J, as a direct consequence of Defendants’ enforce
ment of The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,
the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, would tend to reduce or
depress the profits of Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J from what
profits would otherwise be earned had the State of Maine not
enacted the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,

the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691
- 2696, and/or the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act,"
22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698.
30.

A reduction in the profits, or earnings, of Pfizer,

Merck and/or J&J, as a direct consequence of Defendants’
enforcement of The "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.
§2681, the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S.
§§2691 - 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs
Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, would tend to reduce or
depress the respective market capitalizations of Pfizer,
Merck and/or J&J, which would be reflected in the respective
market prices accorded to one share of stock of Pfizer, Merck
and/or J&J.
31.

A reduction in the market capitalizations of

Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, resulting from a reduction in
earnings, or profits, of Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, as a
direct consequence of Defendants’ enforcement of the
"Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S.

§2681, the

"Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 2696, and the "Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act," 22
M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, would reduce or depress the value of
Plaintiff’s property interest, or equity ownership interest,
in Pfizer, Merck and/or J&J, and would thereby amount to a
"taking" from Plaintiff of private property for public use,
without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
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Amendment of the United States Constitution and made
applicable to Defendants, acting within their respective
official capacities on behalf of, and for, the State of
Maine, via incorporation, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .of the United States Constitution,
thereby violating Plaintiff’s civil rights, such violation of
civil rights continuing unabated.
DEMAND FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for judgment as
fo1lows:
I.

The entry of a declaratory judgment holding that

implementation, enforcement, application and/or execution,
under "color of law," of the provisions of the State of
Maine’s "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22 M.R.S. §2681,
establishing "The Maine Rx Program"; the "Prescription Drug
Price Reduction Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2691 - 2696; and the
"Profiteering in Prescription Drugs Act,” 22 M.R.S. §§2697 2698, by Defendant, Angus S. King, Jr., Governor of the State
of Maine, acting in his official capacity as such; Defendant,
Kevin W. Concannon, Commissioner of the Department of Human
Services of the State of Maine, acting in his official
capacity as such; and/or Defendant, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney
General for the State of Maine, acting in his official
capacity as such, constitutes, or would constitute, an
unconstitutional "taking" of Plaintiff’s private property,
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for public use, without just compensation, by eroding the
value of Plaintiff’s property interest, or equity ownership
interest, in Pfizer Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. and/or Johnson &
Johnson, Inc., in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, made applicable to the
Defendants, as public officials acting for, and acting under
"color of law" of, the State of Maine, via incorporation,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, thereby violating Plaintiff’s
civil rights, such violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights
continuing unabated.
II.

The entry of orders granting Plaintiff preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendant, Angus S.
King, Jr., Governor of the State of Maine, acting in his
official capacity as such; Defendant, Kevin W. Concannon,
Commissioner of the Department of Human Services of the State
of Maine, acting in his official capacity as such; and,
Defendant, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General for the State of
Maine, acting in his official capacity as such, and all those
knowingly acting in concert with any of said Defendants, from
implementing, applying, enforcing or otherwise executing any
and all provisions of the "Prescription Drug Access Act," 22
M.R.S. §2681; the "Prescription Drug Price Reduction Act," 22
M.R.S. §§2691 -2696; and the "Profiteering in Prescription
Drugs Act," 22 M.R.S. §§2697 - 2698, to the full extent that
all such statutory laws of the state of Maine, in any manner
-12-
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whatsoever, are implemented, applied, enforced or otherwise
executed for the purposes of controlling, regulating,
eroding, depressing, discounting or, in any manner, whatso
ever capping or limiting the prices charged by Pfizer Inc.,
Merck & Co., Inc. and/or Johnson & Johnson, Inc. for any and
all patented prescription drugs which may be marketed by
Pfizer Inc., Merck & Co., Inc. and/or Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., within the jurisdiction of the State of Maine.
III.

That Plaintiff be awarded his reasonable attorney’s

fees under the Section 2 of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Award Act of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1988.
IV.

That the Court grant Plaintiff such other and

further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the
circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 29, 2001
Coram, New York

Edwin D. Schindler
Plaintiff, pro se
Five Hirsch Avenue
P. O. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Telephone: (631)474-5373
Telefax:
(631)474-5374
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CERTIFICATE

OF

SERVICE

I, EDWIN D. SCHINDLER, hereby certify that a true and
accurate copy of Plaintiff Edwin D. Schindler’s, "AMENDED
COMPLAINT" was sent, via the United States Postal Service Express Mail - Post Office to Addressee

- postage-prepaid -

to:
Angus S. King, Jr.
Governor of the State of Maine
Office of the Governor
1 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0001
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480565 US)
Kevin W. Concannon
Commissioner of the Department of
Human Service of the State of Maine
221 State Street
Augusta, Maine 04333
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480485 US)
G. Steven Rowe
Attorney General for the State of Maine
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
(Express Mail Label No. EF 310480525 US)
on January 29, 2001.

Five Hirsch Avenue
P. 0. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Tel:
(631)474-5373
Fax: (631)474-5374

R EC EIVED
JAW 3 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ATTORNEY GENERAL

DISTRICT OF MAINE
)

EDWIN D. SCHINDLER,

)
)

Plaint if f,

)
)

) Civil Action No. 01-11-B-C

-v.-

)

ANGUS S. KING, as Governor
of the State of Maine,

)
)
)

KEVIN W. CONCANNON, as
)
Commissioner of the Maine
)
Department of Human Services,)

Gene Carter, J.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

)

G. STEVEN ROWE, as Attorney
General for the State of
Maine,

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

_____________________________________)

NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SUMMONS, COMPLAINT
AND AMENDED COMPLAINT. PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P 15(a)
Notice
TO:

Angus S. King, Jr.
Governor of the State of Maine
Office of the Governor
1 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0001
Kevin W. Concannon
Commissioner of the Department of
Human Service of the State of Maine
221 State Street
Augusta, Maine 04333
G. Steven Rowe
Attorney General for the State of Maine
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
The enclosed Summons, Complaint and Amended Complaint
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are being served, via Express Mail - Post Office to Addressee
- Express Mail Label No. EF 310480565 US, upon the Governor
of the State of Maine, pursuant to Rule 4(j)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and, Kevin W. Concannon,
Commissioner of the Department of Human Service of the State
of Maine, 221 State Street, Augusta, Maine 04333 - via
Express Mail - Post Office to Addressee - Express Mail Label
No. EF 310480485 US; and, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General
for the State of Maine, Maine Department of the Attorney
General, 6 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333 - via
Express Mail - Post Office to Addressee - Express Mail Label
No. EF 310480525 US.
This Acknowledgment form is based upon former Rule
4(c )(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
is substantially the same as Maine State Court Form CV-036,
and therefore authorized by current Rule 4(j)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
You must complete the Acknowledgment part of this form
and return one copy of the completed form to the sender
within 20 days from the date of mailing of this Notice to
you.

A postage-paid envelope is enclosed for your

Acknowledgment.
You must sign and date the Acknowledgment.

If you are

served on behalf of a corporation, unincorporated association
(including a partnership), or other entity, you must indicate
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under your signature your relationship to that entity.

If

you are served on behalf of another person and you are
authorized to receive process, you must indicate, under your
signature, your authority.
If you do not complete and return the form to the sender
within 20 days, you (or the party on whose behalf you are
being served) may be required to pay any expenses incurred in
serving a Summons and Complaint in another manner permitted
by law.
If you do complete and return this form, you (or the
party on whose behalf you are being served) must answer the
Amended Complaint according to the time indicated on the
Summons.

If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be

taken against you for the relief demanded in the Amended
Complaint.
This Notice is being served in duplicate.
I declare, under penalty of perjury, that this Notice
and Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons, Complaint and
Amended Complaint was mailed, via Express Mail - Post Office
to Addressee on January 29, 2001, to Gov. Angus S. King, Jr.,
Office of the Governor, 1 State House Station, Augusta, Maine
04333-0001; Kevin W. Concannon, Commissioner of the Depart
ment of Human Service of the State of Maine, 221 State
Street* Augusta, Maine 04333; and, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney
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General for the State of Maine, Maine Department of the
Attorney General, 6 State House Station, Augusta, Maine
04333.

Dated:

January 29, 2001
P. O. Box 966
Coram, New York 11727-0966
Tel: (631)474-5373
Fax: (631)474-5374
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SUMMONS,
COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I received a
copy of the Summons, Complaint and Amended Complaint in the
above-captioned action at one of the following: Office of the
Governor, 1 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333-0001,
for Angus S. King, Jr., Governor of the State of Maine; Kevin
W. Concannon, Commissioner of the Department of Human Service
of the State of Maine, 221 State Street, Augusta, Maine
04333; or, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General for the State of
Maine, Maine Department of the Attorney General, 6 State
House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333.
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